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justify our hopes, by joining in the effort to bring the future of humanity under the majesty of law. (pp. 124-5.)

The late Mr. Holls, who heard this address and whose translation of it is quoted, rightly says that it "ended with an outburst of eloquence which electrified the conference and led to a withdrawal of all hostile nations."

Monsieur Bourgeois' address at the Second Hague Conference in support of the Court of Arbitral Justice was hardly less impressive and saved the measure which he advocated.

The world wants peace.

For centuries we have confessed our faith solely in the formula: "if you wish peace, prepare for war," that is to say, we have contented ourselves with the military organization of peace. We have advanced beyond this, but it is not sufficient to constitute a more humane organization, I was about to say, the pacific organization of war.

The debates which have taken place here have shown us the progress of education in this matter, the new sentiment, each day more impressive, of the solidarity of nations and peoples in the conflict against natural fatalism. We have confidence in the growing action of great moral forces and we hope that the Conference of 1907 will take a decisive step in advance of the work undertaken in 1899 by assuring actually and practically the juridical organization of peace. (pp. 106-7.)

These are but samples of a volume full of hope and generous ideals clothed in language of the utmost felicity. The great statesman and diplomat, for he is both, should be known in this country and the translation of his various addresses would be little less than a public service. Monsieur Bourgeois is still young and the Third Conference of the Hague is yet to be called. May his life be preserved and may he carry to full fruition his projects of international arbitration and the juridical organization of the world in the interest of peace.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

The Interest of America in International Conditions. By Rear-Admiral A. T. Mahan. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 1910. pp. 212.

This book may be described, generally, as a study of the principles upon which the society of nations is organized and governed at the present time; and, particularly, as a study of the relation which the United States bears to the whole international political organism. The conclusion of the author is, that the society of nations is held together

in a condition of equilibrium and peace — in so far as peace exists — by certain great international dispositions and adjustments, partaking of the nature of constitutional settlements or legislative acts, designed to prevent the operation of the principle of “the balance of power”; and that the United States is equally concerned with all the other nations of the world in the maintenance of these international adjustments.

The history of the development of the balance of power principle and of the political adjustments necessary to control the principle, is traced from the Reformation to the present day. It is shown that the balance of power principle is a principle of individual and national self-preservation, whereby, when one nation becomes powerful and uses its power oppressively as respects individuals or aggressively as respects other nations, the weaker nations combine until their combined power overbalances that of the oppressor and aggressor nation and they are able to compel it to deal fairly; thus restoring the political equilibrium and the general peace and order. After considering the loss by Spain and France of their hegemony of Europe through the operation of this principle, the author proceeds to consider the present hegemony of Great Britain and to give the reasons which have enabled it to hold its leading position without falling a victim to the balance of power principle. He attributes this in part to the insular position of Great Britain which makes it secure from attack and deprives it of any motive for territorial aggression on the states of the European Continent; and in part to its general fair treatment of the citizens of European states and its comparative liberality as respects international trade — in short, to its respect for the rights of individuals and states. The hegemony of Great Britain, he shows, differs in character from the hegemony which any European Continental state could exercise, in that Great Britain is external to the Continent and, being secure by its insular position from attack, is free to throw its influence as it thinks proper and thus to play the part of a mediator and to be an equilibrative and determinative factor in European state rivalries. A Continental state which should gain the hegemony of Europe, being surrounded by the states over which it would exercise the hegemony, would be subject to attack, and might find it necessary, in order to preserve its paramount influence, to convert its hegemony into a political domination of the whole Continent.

The growth of Germany and its alliance with Austria have, as the author believes, a tendency to make Germany the hegemonic state of Europe and, by reason of its situation, to bring about either the political

domination of Europe by Germany or a general European war growing out of the operation of the balance of power principle. This, he thinks, would be the more likely to happen because in Germany the rights of the individual against the Government are less than in Great Britain and many of the other countries of Europe; so that an attempt to extend German legal and political notions in Europe would be regarded generally as oppressive and aggressive. Should an issue arise in Europe involving the fundamental rights of individuals and states, the result would be in the author's opinion, to call into operation the principle of the balance of power throughout the world, which might involve the United States.

The author next considers the Monroe Doctrine. This, he shows, resulted from the balance of power principle. That principle is not directed against the existence of large and powerful nations, or against the hegemony of such nations, but only against the oppressive or aggressive use of great power. If a great nation uses its power for the protection and preservation of individual and state rights, the balance of power principle has no operation. The Monroe Doctrine was an assertion of the permanent hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and a covenant by the United States with the rest of the world never to use its hegemony either oppressively towards individuals or aggressively towards states. The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, now deserves and has international recognition and support as one of the great international constitutional dispositions and adjustments designed to secure the general peace and order by protecting individual and state rights. The author's words on this subject are worth quotation. He says (p. 121):

The Balance of Power is the expression of the stage in European history which followed the successful efforts by which many members constituted themselves into several organic bodies, called states. This also evidently is still the stage in which Western civilization is. The consequence has been to constitute the separate states into a community, by imparting to each and all a common idea,—that of balance of power as essential to national independence. However discordant the interests of the several members, however diverse the national characters which have resulted from the original differences of raw material—heredity—and from the centuries of varying political environment, the common instinct of self-preservation has drawn out and sustained this common conception of statehood, in the holding of which they find relationship. The Monroe Doctrine itself is an enunciation of a balance of powers by the formulation of which the United States has established relationship and inclusion in the European community—not the European system—so far as membership is concerned. * * *

Thus, as in the Middle Ages many provinces, many lords, at divers times and by divers roads, found their way to unity, in one country, or under one sovereign, thus forming a state; so the community of states, of this tradition, is feeling its way towards a unity of its own.

The principle of the "Open Door" in China is, as the author shows, also an international adjustment for the purpose of preventing the operation of the balance of power principle as respects the nations other than China. These nations have united in a joint hegemony over China, but they have obligated themselves to use their joint and several power protectively and preservatively and with due regard for individual and state rights. Should any one of these nations attempt, by the conquest of China and Manchuria, to gain predominance in the Orient, it might be necessary for the rest of the world to apply the principle of the balance of power, since it is to be feared that any nation which should enter upon such a plan of conquest would not use great power with due regard to individual and state rights. On this subject, the author says (pp. 129, 144, 184) :

The Western nations, while all the time quarreling among themselves, observed towards those of the Farther East substantially the same line of conduct, the result being that in this respect the West has been towards the East a homogeneous preponderating power. * * *

The Open Door is but another way of expressing Balance of Power; for, while conspicuously just and making for peace, — as the balance of power has, — it means simply equal opportunity, just as balance of power means equal independence. But, like the balance of power, the maintenance of the Open Door is the result of a balancing of forces — the forces of the various states interested in the commerce and development of China. * * *

Just how far the maintenance of the Open Door may carry the interested nations to decisive action in support of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, remains to be seen. Overt action, as distinct from the latent power to act, will be necessary only in case some among the countries concerned obtain, by positions, by predominant force, by intrigue, or by the negligence of rivals, a preponderance, destroying that balance which the Open Door requires. Equilibrium will ensure quiet. Thus the Open Door, which in principle has received the adhesion of the Western community of nations, does not stand isolated, as an unrelated doctrine, but is a positive and formulated attitude affecting, however unconsciously of its range, the general policy of contact between the East and the West.

The British Empire also, as the author shows, is an international adjustment which prevents the operation of the balance of power principle among the widely scattered States which form that empire. All the British Colonies in which the occidental races predominate look to Great Britain as their hegemonic nation, relying upon its ability and willing-

ness to protect and preserve their individual and state rights. As the author says (p. 28):

England alone, saw in [colonies] not so much possessions, as extensions of England herself. The British colony * * * was politically as well as industrially an expansion of the mother state. This did not save Great Britain from a selfish policy towards her colonies; but because they, as formally constituted, were considered the abode of Englishmen, entitled to all the traditional and constitutional privileges of English citizens, there existed from the first an underlying spirit of appreciation, which, after the severe lesson of the War of American Independence, — during which the English rights of the colonists were admitted by the very large minority of the English at home, — has resulted in the formal and cordial relations that are now the common aim, professed by all the English-speaking communities of the British Empire.

The author concludes that the danger of breach of these various international adjustments at the present time arises from the possibility of Germany obtaining predominance in Europe and Japan in Asia. He thinks, however, that for some time to come, Germany will be held in check by the power of Great Britain, and that, therefore, Japan is the nation most likely in the immediate future to cause disturbance to the peace of the world.

Whether or not we agree with the author's conclusion regarding Germany and Japan, we must admit our debt to him for presenting in a brief form what may be called the existing plan of government of the society of nations. From the survey which he has made of the present situation it appears that the society of nations is actually subject to certain great international dispositions and adjustments which are of the nature of constitutional or supreme-legislative acts. The legislation necessary to produce these great dispositions and adjustments has not been made by any representative legislature of the nations of the world, but has been formulated in all sorts of ways and has obtained the sanction of the civilized world so that it is maintained by physical force. The sentences of punishment of nations for oppression or aggression have not been rendered by any court of the nations of the world, but they have been rendered in all sorts of ways and have been executed by physical force sanctioned by the general sentiment. All of which seems to tend to prove that the society of nations is not a mere congeries of unrelated states, but is in fact at the present moment a political organism or union, which legislates, adjudicates and executes for itself — not in the way to which we are accustomed, but in a way which is effective to keep the peace most of the time and to restrict war almost entirely to those cases where it is necessary to punish a wrong-doing nation.

A. H. SNOW.